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Following  the  Hausmann,  et  al.  (2005)  methodology,  we  attempt  to 
identify the constraints to growth in Pakistan. We argue that governance failure 
and institutional shortcomings are the heart of the matter: corruption is rampant, 
judicial independence is low, educational institutions do not furnish the right 
kind of labour force, legal institutions do not protect the lenders against loan 
defaults, ambiguous land titles constrain mortgage financing and construction 
activity, labour market institutions restrict hiring/firing, State Bank of Pakistan 
(SBP) has not done its duty to contain the rising interest spread, and SECP/stock 
market  has  not  played  its  due  role  in  the  transfer  of  funds  from  savers  to 
investors. We identify three binding constraints to growth in Pakistan. These 
are: (i) poor state of governance, (ii) poor state of institutions, and (iii) lack of 
competitive environment (that restricts innovation and hence growth). Without 
improving the state of governance and that of institutions, sustainable growth 
cannot occur even if other factors, like a reasonable savings rate, are put in 
place.  
JEL classification:  O40, O43, O11, O12. 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan’s  growth  performance  has  been  fluctuating  over  time, 
through the decades of 1960s, 1980s, with some high growth episodes but 
relatively low growth is observed in the decades of 1970s and 1990s.   The 
fluctuating pattern is evident in recent performance as well (Annexure 1). 
The first half of ’90s, except for the year 92-93, posted reasonable growth 
rate however the growth performance during the 2nd half of ’90s seems less 
than  satisfactory.   GDP  growth,  though  low  in  the  initial  years  of  the 
ongoing decade, started picking up to reach a peak level of 8.6 percent in 
2004-5  and  declined  again  in  the  next  year  to  6.6  percent.  The  growth 
pattern observed overtime raises a number of questions including as to what 
constrains growth and what kind of reforms are needed to embark upon a 
high but sustainable growth path. 
In Pakistan, the reforms, with the theme being, by and large, in agreement 
with  Washington  consensus
1  were  initiated  in  1988  under  the  Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of IMF.  The reforms were intended in three key 
areas that include; fiscal policy, monetary policy/financial sector and foreign 
trade sector. Under the reform package of 1988 fiscal deficit was to be brought 
in  the  range  of  4.0  percent  from  the  high  level  of  8.0  percent  in  1988. 
Accordingly  major  emphasis  was  placed  on  resource  mobilisation.  Specific 
measures recommended in this regard, included; introduction of general sales 
tax,  unification  of  corporate tax  and reduction  of  tax  holiday provisions.  To 
increase non-tax revenues user charges for utilities like electricity, natural gas 
and water were to be introduced. On expenditure side, government expenditure, 
particularly current expenditure, was to be contained, by eliminating/lowering 
subsidies. Defence expenditure was to be contained and increase in petroleum 
cost was to be passed on to consumers. Most of the measures recommended by 
SAPs were implemented and fiscal deficit for the last few years is within the 4.0 
percent limit recommended by IMF. 
To liberalise the trade regime, import tariffs were reduced and most of 
non-tariff barriers were eliminated. Accordingly the maximum tariff that stood 
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at 150 percent in 1988 has been reduced over the years to 25 percent and the list 
of banned items mostly include the ones that cannot be allowed due religious, 
security, health and reciprocity considerations. On privatisation front, large scale 
privatisation/divesture of state owned entities has been undertaken to improve 
the efficiency of the enterprises and reduce the burden on national exchequer. 
Four major banks, PTCL, KESC and number of other entities stand privatised. 
In  the  monetary  area,  the  underlying  objective  of  reforms  was  that 
controlled  monetary  policy  should  give  way  to  the  market  based  monetary 
policy  and  market  forces  be  allowed  to  determine  the  interest  rate.  In  this 
context  auctioning  of  treasury  bills  was  initiated  in  1991  and  Open  Market 
Operation  (OMOs)  were  introduced  in  1995.  Interest  on  concessional  credit 
schemes, like export refinance, were linked with the Treasury bill rate. Credit 
ceilings  imposed  on  banks  were  done  away  with  and  Statutory  Liquidity 
Reserve (SLR) for commercial banks was drastically cut down to around 15 
percent of  deposits,  from the high  of 35-40 percent.  Various measures were 
undertaken to strengthen the health and competitiveness of banking sector that 
had been leaning under the weight of non-performing loans. In this connection 
Prudential regulations for banks were framed, a credit information bureau, that 
would provide information on defaulters of bank loans was established in SBP, 
non-remunerative branches of banks were closed and downsizing of staff was 
undertaken  ultimately leading  to  the privatisation  of  banks. Finally in recent 
years again major reforms have been initiated in the tax system to widen the tax 
base and strengthen tax administration.  
Though  the  reforms  envisaged  in  Pakistan  generated  some  positive 
impact on growth but it appears that neither the reforms have put Pakistan on a 
sustainable  growth  path  nor  have  these  addressed  the  issue  of  poverty.  This 
brings us to the question of as to what kind of reforms suit a specific country. 
The impact of any kind of policy reform on economic growth, among other 
things, is a function of country’s circumstances. Similar kind of reforms in two 
countries, with different conditions, may contribute to high growth rate in one 
country but generate adverse affects in the other one. This happened with the 
policies  recommended  by  Washington  Consensus.  Reforms  like  trade  and 
financial  liberalisation,  privatisation,  deregulation,  security  of  property  rights 
and  competitive  exchange  rates  etc.  led  to  varying  outcomes  in  different 
countries.  
All countries have their unique constraints, opportunities and threats. Any 
set of  policies neglecting  the uniqueness cannot be successful.  For  example, 
policy reforms recommended by Washington Consensus failed in Argentina but 
these worked well in most of the Latin American Countries, especially in Chile. 
Most  of  the  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  also  remained  unsuccessful  to 
achieve a desired growth rate even after applying very strict policy reforms, 
however  Tanzania,  and  Mozambique  did  well  after  instituting  these  reform 
policies [Rodrik (2006)]. Thus the argument here is that any standard set of  
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reforms cannot be applied to a country just because these worked very well in 
another country.  Rodrik  (2006) states: 
When investment is constrained by poor property rights, improving 
financial intermediation will not help. When it is constrained by 
high  cost  of  capital,  improving  institutional  quality  will  hardly 
work. [Rodrick (2006)].  
Therefore  the  major  challenge  is  to  identify  the  factors  that  constrain 
growth in a specific country so that while devising the set of policy reforms 
constraints could be properly accounted for  Hausmann, et al. (2005) argue that, 
quite often the policy-makers are presented with a long list (the laundry list) of 
reforms. The policy-makers either attempt to fix all the problems simultaneously 
or alternatively start with reforms that are not very crucial to their country’s 
growth  potential.  More  often  than  not  the  reforms  in  one  area  have  led  to 
unanticipated  distortion  in  another  area.  Given  these  difficulties,  the  authors 
propose that countries need to identify one or two most binding constraints to 
their economies and attempt to lift these constraints. To identify the binding 
constraints  the  authors  propose  a  decision  tree  methodology.  The  authors, 
primarily, concern themselves with short-run constraints, that is, identification 
of  constraints  that  inevitably  emerge  as  economy  expands  and  not  the 
identification of constraints that may emerge in future. The authors argue that 
appropriate policy measures if focussed on binding constraints will produce the 
‘biggest bang for reform buck’.  
This study is organised as follows: Section two describes the theoretical 
framework used by Hausmann, et al.  Section 3 examines the possible constraints 
to growth and identifies the binding ones.  Section 4 concludes the study.   
2.  THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR  
GROWTH DIAGNOSTICS 
To identify the constraints to growth facing Pakistan and prioritise these 
as  binding  for  growth  we  use  Hausmann,  et  al.  (2005)  decision  tree 
methodology (Flow chart at annexure 2). The authors have applied the frame 
work to identify the binding constraints for Brazil, EL Salvador and Dominican 
Republic.  The  methodology  has  also  been  applied  by  Richter  (2006)  and 
Leipziger and Zagha (2006). We would like to caution at the outset that if we do 
not  label  a  variable  as  binding  constraint  this  by  no  means  imply  that  the 
variable is not a constraint/source of growth in the traditional sense. All we 
mean  is  that  given  the  present  economic  environment,  targeting  a  certain 
variable, which is considered a source of growth as per conventional wisdom, 
need not be a policy priority in  the short run because either  there are  more 
important things to take care off or that the pre-requisites essential for reforming 




The basic assumption of the decision tree methodology is that private 
investment and therefore growth depends upon the cost of finance and return to 
economic activity. Under the methodology first and foremost it is determined 
whether the cost of finance is high or that return to economic activity is low. 
Once the problem area has been identified then the attention is focused upon the 
determinants of the problem area. The authors believe that the cost of finance 
depends upon the level of savings of the economy, the state of intermediation 
and availability of external finance on reasonable terms. The return to economic 
activity, on the other hand, is considered to be a function of the level of social 
returns and the level of private appropriability of returns. Social returns in turn 
depend  upon  factors  like  human  capital  and  infrastructure  while  private 
appropriability  of  returns  is  thought  to  be  a  function  of  factors  like 
macroeconomic stability, governance and innovation etc.   
The decision  tree framework argues that the distortions that make the 
economy  under  perform  impose  the  private  and  social  valuation  of  certain 
economic behaviour. The wedges created by these distortions can be denoted by:  
t =  {t1, t2,…….. tk}   …  …  …  …  …  (1) 
where ti represents the distortion in activity i.  
These distortions can be modelled as constraints on the policy making 
problems and can be written in general: 
µi
s(t,…) - µi
p(t,…) – ti = 0  …  …  …  …  …  (2) 
where, 
µi
s(t,…) = society’s net marginal valuation of activity i 
µi
p(t,…) = Private agents net marginal valuation of activity i 
Besides  the  distortions  ‘t’  there  are  many  other  factors  which  affect 
economic  activities.  It  is  important  to  mention  here  that  private  and  social 
valuation functions for each activity will depend in general equilibrium on all 
the wedges in the system. These distortions upset the overall welfare ‘µ’of the 
economy. The marginal gain in welfare from reducing one of the distortions is:  
dµ/dtj = - j 
 
i [d{µi
s (t,…) – µi
p(t,…)}] / dtj  …  …  …  (3) 
where  i >
 
0, i ={1,2,…., k} are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the 
constraints associated with each of the distortions. The first term on the right 
hand side of equation (3) captures the ‘direct effect’ of a small change in tj: a 
small reduction in tj  increases aggregate welfare by an amount given by the 
multiplier associated with the jth constraint,  j. The second term captures the 
effect of varying tj on the aggregated sum of the gaps between the social and the 
private valuation, with the weights corresponding to each distorted activity’s 
own Lagrange multiplier.  
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The authors start with a simple endogenous growth model comprising 
number  of  distortions.  According  to  the  standard  model,  consumption  and 
capital grow, along a balanced growth path in the following manner:  








t  …  …  …  …  (4) 
Where:   
c = consumption 
k = capital 
r = the rate of return on capital 
t = the tax rate on capital, actual or expected
 
 
= the world rate of interest 
s = intertemporal elasticity of consumption 
a dot over a variable denotes the rate of change over time. 
Besides, the private return on capital r is given by: 
r = r(a,  , x)  …  …  …  …  …  …  (5) 
where:  
a = indicator of total factor productivity  
x = availability of complementary factors of production, such as 
infrastructure and human capital.  
 
= index of externality (a higher   means a larger distortion). 
Equations  (4)  and  (5)  summarise  the  possible  factors  that  can  affect 
growth. The challenge in this approach is to identify such reforms, which will 
provide the high positive direct effect. The figure at annexure 2 presents the 
whole framework in tree-form. The tree diagram shows that mainly there are 
two possible reasons for low demand for investment and entrepreneurship. First 
is  the  high  cost  of  finance  and  the  second  one  is  the  low  private  return  to 
domestic investment. We take up these in the following sections.  
3.  THE ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS 
In this section we analyse the elements of the decision tree framework to 
determine as to which one of these constitute binding constraints to growth in 
Pakistan. The terminal year of our analyses is FY 2005-06.   
3.1.  Low Savings 
A  large  body  of  literature  on  economic  growth  tends  to  support  the 
traditional Solow (1956) growth model and the “New Growth Models” of David 
Romer’s and others in which higher savings leads to higher growth [see for 




long-term saving rate as an independent variable and establish a linkage from 
savings to growth.  
The gross saving as percentage of GNI for Pakistan are 23.6 as of FY 
2004 (Table 1). This rate is more or less similar to other countries falling in 
upper middle income (23.1) countries but is relatively less than those classified 
as middle income (28.3) and lower middle income (32.1) countries.   
Table 1  




(Percentage of GNI) 
Net Savings
 
(Percentage of GNI) 
Low Income  22.7  13.5 
Middle Income  28.3  17.2 
Lower Middle Income  32.1  21.3 
Upper Middle Income  23.1  11.6 
Low and Middle Income  27.5  16.6 
East Asia and Pacific  39.1  28.6 
Europe and Central Asia  23.4  12.7 
Latin America and Carib.  22.7  10.6 
Middle East and North Africa  30.0  18.8 
South Asia  23.6  14.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa  17.1  6.2 
High Income  19.4  6.2 
Europe EMU  20.8  6.6 
World  20.8  8.1 
Pakistan  23.6  15.4 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2006, the World Bank. 
  
 
Gross savings are the difference between gross national income and consumption, plus net 
current transfers. 
 
Net savings are gross savings minus the consumption of fixed capital.  
If we assume that the saving rate of Pakistan is relatively low still for 
saving to be a binding constraint we need to determine whether these satisfy 
some criteria. Hausmann, et al. (2005) and Rodrick (2006) presented criteria to 
analyse the lowness of savings in a country. The criteria are:  
(i)  High foreign debt and large current account deficit 
(ii)  Greater willingness to remunerate savings through high interest rate to 
depositors.  
(iii)  Real interest rates to be high, borrowers to be chasing lenders,  
(iv)  Entrepreneurs to be full of investment ideas. 
(v) In such an economy, an exogenous increase in investible funds, foreign 
aid and remittances, will primarily push investment and other productive  
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economic activities rather than fuel consumption or investment in real 
estate. 
To  determine  whether  or  not  Pakistan  is  saving  constrained  as  per 
Hausmann, et al. barometer, the data on the three relevant variables is presented 
below (Table 2).  
Table 2 
Foreign Debt, Current Account Deficit, and Weighted Average Cost of Deposits 


















1996-97  46.9  6.80  –7.20  16.1  11.8  4.3 
1997-98  55.4  6.81  –6.20  15.7  7.8  7.9 
1998-99  54.9  6.49  –3.10  9.8  5.7  4.1 
1999-00  51.7  5.47  –4.10  7.2  3.5  3.7 
2000-01  52.1  5.27  –1.60  12.9  4.4  8.5 
2001-02  50.9  3.61  –0.70  6.3  3.5  2.8 
2002-03  43.1  1.61  1.90  1.7  3.1  –1.4 
2003-04  36.7  0.95  3.80  2.3  4.6  –2.3 
2004-05  32.6  1.37  1.40  7.9  9.3  –1.4 
2005-06  29.1  2.89  –1.60  8.1  8.0  0.1 
SBP Annual Reports: Various issues.  
As may be seen from Table 2 foreign debt as percentage of GDP has 
registered significant improvement since 2001-02 and declined to 29.1 percent 
of  GDP  by  2005-06.  The  foreign  debt  at  29.1  percent  of  GDP  cannot  be 
considered high, especially when the ceiling fixed by fiscal responsibility law is 
much  higher.  Similarly  the  current  account  deficit  has  shown  remarkable 
improvement during the last couple of years and has been even in surplus for the 
three years just preceding 2005-06. The return to depositors after registering a 
decline since 1999-00 has shown some improvement during the last two years 
but still the return to depositors at an average of 2.89 percent is rather low. 
Besides the real interest rate at 0.1 percent as at end of 2005-06 is very low and 
has even remained negative during the preceding three years.  If an economy is 
constrained by low savings then the borrowers are found chasing the lenders and 
given the scarcity of savings, there is a willingness to remunerate these at a 
higher rate. The rather low return to depositors and the low real interest rate 
(Table 2) point towards just the opposite. The mechanics employed by banks for 
consumer  financing  also  reveal,  that  currently  the  lenders  are  chasing  the 
borrowers rather than being the other way round. Such characteristics can hardly 
be of a country that is dying to generate additional savings. Given the foregoing, 
we conclude that at least as per Hausmann, et al. measure Pakistan is not savings 




Anecdotal evidence on the utilisation of exogenous inflows suggests that 
increase in exogenous inflows, particularly remittances, of foreign funds has not 
fully translated into productive investment rather such inflows have ended up in 
real estate. The inference that the remittances had found way into the real estate 
is borne by the unprecedented increase in real estate prices in 2003-04. Had the 
economy been constrained by low saving the surge in remittances would have 
found way into productive investment rather than in real estate. 
The fragile relationship observed between investment as percentage of 
GDP  and National Savings as percentage of GDP (Fig. 1) also  supports the 
argument that Pakistan is not saving constrained. Over the last ten years though 
the national savings have fluctuated widely the investment rate has remained 
relatively stable,  especially after  year  2000.  (Since year 2000  while national 
savings have fluctuated within a wide band of 15.8 to 20.6 percent of GDP, 
while the investment rate remained within a narrow band of 17.4 to 16.9 percent 
of GDP). This shows that the investment rate, at least within a certain band, is 
insensitive to savings and therefore implies that savings rate, if at all low, does 
not constitute a binding constraint to growth of the economy.   


























Besides the low savings rate, discussed above, another reason for the low 
level of private investment in a country could be the low return to economic 
activity. Section 3.2 is devoted to the discussion of return to economic activity 
in Pakistan.   
3.2.  Low Return to Economic Activity  
Rodrick (2006) argues that in an economy faced with low private returns 
to capital the following symptoms will be apparent: 
(i)  Low interest rates  
(ii)  High bank liquidity  
(iii)  Lenders chasing borrowers,  
(iv)  Current account is near balance or is in surplus   
9
 
(v)  Entrepreneurs are more interested in putting their money in a foreign 
country rather than investing it at home. An increase in foreign aid or 
remittances finances consumption, housing, or causes capital flight. 
It appears that most of the indicators of low private returns are present in 
Pakistan. We have already shown that interest rates are low, lenders are chasing 
borrowers  and  that  increase  in  remittances  has  gone  into  real  estate.  Thus 
Pakistan seems to be a country where the private returns are low. 
It  is  argued  that  Low  private  returns  could  be  either  due  low 
appropriability of returns or low social return. The reason for low appropriability 
could be the policy (governance)/institutional failure or the market failure. On 
the other hand poor infrastructure or little/poor human capital may cause the 
social returns to be low. We discuss these issues in the following sections.  
3.3.  Low Appropriability  
3.3.1.  Government Failure 
In this section we discuss some evidence from different indices to arrive 
at an overall picture of the state of governance in Pakistan.  
As  per  the  survey  of  Transparency  International  on  the  level  of 
corruption, Pakistan is ranked 147 out of 163, with 163
rd being the most corrupt. 
Further Pakistan’s overall rank in Global competitiveness index is 91 out of 125 
countries, which reflects a very poor level of competitiveness
2. Pakistan ranking 
is  also  low  on  judicial  independence  and existence of  well  defined  property 
rights (77 and 71 respectively out 102).  
Launching  a  (small)  business  in  Pakistan,  on  average  requires  going 
through 11 different procedures that require 24 days for completion. For OECD 
countries this average is 6.2 days with number of days required for completion 
being limited to 16.6. Pakistan ranks 78th on the ‘Difficulty of hiring index’,
3 
while the rankings for OECD and the region are 27 and 41.8 respectively. On 
legal rights index Pakistan enjoys a ranking of 4 as against 3.8 for the region and 
6.3 for OECD.
4   The average tax rate at 43.4 percent in Pakistan is less than that 
applicable in the region (45.1 percent).
5  
                                             
 
2According to structure of the index higher ranking implies poorer competitiveness. Deeper 
examination of the index tells that five factors are considered most problematic for doing business in 
Pakistan.  These  include:  corruption,  government  instability/coups,  policy  instability,  inefficient 
government, bureaucracy and inadequate supply of infrastructure. Interestingly all the five factors 
can be grouped under one title—government failure. 
3This index assigns value between 0-100 with the lower value being adverse. 
4The legal rights index ranges from 0-10, with higher scores indicating that those laws are 
better designed to expand credit. The index specifically measures the degree to which collateral and 
bankruptcy laws facilitate lending. 
5Cost of Doing Business: World Bank Report (2006):  
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Five sectors of  Pakistan’s economy viz. fisheries, mining,  ready made 
garments,  light  engineering  and  dairy  carry  great  potential  but  face  serious 
constraints  [World  Bank  (2006)].
6  The  constraints  include:  high  freight, 
electricity  outages,  delay  in  collecting  rebates,  bribes  at  the  harbour  and 
government  involvement  in  cotton  seed.  All  these  constraints  are  directly 
traceable to poor governance.  [Shaikh (2006)]. 
All the evidence presented above leads us to conclude that the state of 
governance  in  Pakistan  is  poor  and  this  has  contributed  to  the  low 
appropriability of returns to investment in Pakistan.   
3.3.2.  Institutional Failure   
(a) Legal Institutions 
Azfar (2006) accords high priority to enactment of good commercial laws 
and their enforcement. According to him, commercial laws include collateral 
laws—which  define the relationships between  lenders and  borrowers in  debt 
markets—and corporate laws—which define the rights of shareholders in equity 
markets. Collateral laws and corporate laws are important for augmenting the 
markets for loans and equity, respectively [Azfar and Matheson (1999)];  
The state of collateral laws vis-à-vis bank lending in Pakistan is discussed 
below: 
Banks  in  Pakistan  have  faced  huge  defaults  on  amounts  lent  but  the 
collateral laws have not come to the rescue of the bankers. As per law a bank 
cannot on its own appropriate the collaterals against the amount in default rather 
the bank has to approach the courts for the purpose. When a bank files a suit 
against  a  defaulting  borrower,  it  takes  years  and  years  before,  a  defaulting 
borrower is declared bankrupt, and even more time is required to get the decree 
enforced. Finally when the assets are to be auctioned to pay off the debtors it is 
discovered  that  the  assets  have  been  fraudulently  taken  out  of  the  business 
premises and are not traceable.  It is this dismal situation due to which the state 
owned banks have been running into losses and the government had to inject 
equity of Rs 20.0 billion and Rs 7.0 billion respectively in United Bank and 
Habib Bank (while these banks were in public sector) to make these viable for 
privatisation. Besides to clean the balance sheet of state owned banks a, separate 
corporation was created by the government, to which, based on a certain criteria, 
the non-performing loans of banks were transferred.  
Given  the  above  account  it  is  apparent  that  as  far  as  the  collateral 
law/banking law is concerned, the performance of legal institutions leaves much 
to be desired. The poor enforcement of collateral laws is just one example of the 
failure the legal institutions. Many other cases could be cited to prove the failure 
of the legal institutions.  
                                             
 
6Value Chain Index.  
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(b) Land Titles 
Mortgage  Financing  (House  Building  Finance)  is  gradually  gaining 
ground in Pakistan but only in urban centres. Despite the urge banks have so far 
failed to introduce mortgage financing in villages. Typically, the land on which 
the  house  is  to  be  constructed  serves  as  collateral  for  the  bank  loan.  The 
ambiguity/disputes over land title in villages shy away the banker. Weaker land 
titles are at the heart of the near-absence of mortgage financing in villages. Thus 
due the failure of the legal institutions to do their bit, much needed construction 
activity, that can contribute significantly to growth, is not being undertaken.  
The  theories  that  lay  emphasis  on  encouraging  savings  to  increase 
growth,  assume  that  savings  are  converted  into  investment.  The  poor 
implementation of collateral laws and weaker land titles constrain bank lending 
and therefore investment activity. Therefore the increase in savings per se will 
not increase investment because legal institutions that are supposed to facilitate 
the investor are not strong enough.  
(c)  Financial Institutions  
(i)  Banks 
As an illustration of SBP weakness we discuss below SBP’s failure to 
control the rather high interest spread. However this by no means is the only 
weakness with the system.  
From January 2004 to June 2006 average interest spread has risen by 1.94 
percentage points. During this period the weighted average interest earned on 
loans outstanding had increased by 3.49 percentage points whereas the weighted 
average interest paid on bank deposit has risen by only 1.55 percentage points 
only. This unequal increase in lending and deposit rates has caused the spread to 
rise. Khawaja and Din (2007) argue that inelasticity of deposit supply is the 
main driving force behind the rising interest spread.  
The central bank being the regulator of banks has issued public warnings 
to the banks that failure to pay a higher return to depositors would force the 
central bank to take action against the banks. Despite the fact that the spread is 
still very high (7.14 as of December 2007) the warning has not been translated 
into action. Thus it is the institutional weakness 
___ the weakness of SBP which 
is responsible for the rising spread.  
(ii)  Capital Markets 
Capital  markets  are  intermediaries  between  savers  and  investors.  In 
capital markets, one way to channel funds from savers to investors is through 
Initial  Public  Offerings  (IPOs)
___sale  of  securities  in  the  primary  market.  In 
Pakistan the proportion of capital mobilised through IPOs is rather low. The 
capital mobilised through IPOs over the past 8 years is shown in Table 3.  
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  Table 3 
Initial Public Offerings 
Year 
No. of  
IPOs 
Amount of Offering 
(Rs in millions) 
2007  14  32,330 
2006  3  8,319 
2005  18  38,082 
2004  12  82,861 
2003  4  4,834 
2002  4  3,166 
2001  3  1,180 
2000  3  171 
 
 
The rather low rate of IPOs could be due to either of the following two 
reasons:  one;  the  institutional  mechanism  does  not  sufficiently  facilitate  the 
firms in generation of capital through the capital markets or two; lack of demand 
for funds or put differently low return on investment in equity securities deters 
investors.  
The  possible  mechanisms  for  conducting  IPOs  include  (i)  Fixed  price 
mechanism,  (ii)  Auction  procedure  and  (iii)  Book  Building  procedure.  In 
Pakistan IPOs are conducted through fixed price mechanism only where as in 
developed  markets  the  other  two  procedures  are  mostly  used
7.  Under  the 
mechanism that Pakistan  follows permission for  the floatation  price is to  be 
sought  from  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  of  Pakistan  (SECP).  The 
SECP typically does not allow floatation at a premium. Sohail and Nasr (2007) 
have shown that average underpricing in Pakistan is 36 percent, which is rather 
high relative to the underpricing observed in developed capital markets. The 
potential loss, to existing shareholders, due to underpricing, could be one reason 
why companies do not go for IPOs. The fact that Pakistan is sticking to a least 
efficient IPO procedure that has lost popularity in the developed world, speaks 
of the failure of the regulator. 
Another reason why companies do not go for IPOs is that young and 
small companies  are not able to capture the investors’ trust. The reason for lack 
of investors’ trust is that generally enough dividends are not paid forcing the 
minority shareholders to rely on price movements for securing return through 
capital  gain.  Price  appreciation,  being  the major  source of  gain  for  ordinary 
investors, vested interests engages in all sorts of wrongdoings to ensure price 
appreciation  however  since  equilibrium  cannot  be  established  at  a  price  not 
supported  by  fundamentals  of  the  company,  the  market  therefore  becomes 
                                             
 
7For  merits/demerits  of  the  three  procedure,  [see  Benveniste  and  Spindt  (1989),  Biais, 
Bossaert, and Rochet (2002), Biais and Crouzet (2002)].    
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volatile. This drives the passive investor out of the market leaving the market in 
the hands of day traders, who have an interest in keeping the market volatile. 
The volatility in turn discourages the small investor from buying shares be it in 
the secondary market or through IPOs.  
Had the companies been paying  sufficient return to investors in  the 
form of dividend the investors would not carry the incentive to indulge in price 
manipulation  and  speculation  that  keeps  the  market  volatile  [Qayyum  and 
Kemal (2006)]. The SECP and the stock exchange rules do provide that payment 
of cash dividend is must once in five years. However no severe action is taken 
against  the  companies  that  default  on  payment  of  dividend.  Besides,  small 
investors generally prefer a regular stream of income. This perhaps calls for 
dividends almost every year. It is the lack of dividends that keeps the investors 
interest low in IPOs. The SECP and the stock exchange management can frame 
rules that bound the companies to pay dividends more frequently but so far not 
much  has  been  done  in  this  regard.  Thus  once  again  it  is  the  institutional 
weakness—the  weakness  of  SECP  and  Stock  exchange  authorities  that 
constrains IPOs. Thus a key channel that transfers funds from savers to investors 
is not functioning to its potential.  
(d) Educational Institutions 
Aghion, Meghir, and Vandenbussche (2003) show that countries close to 
the technological frontier require greater investment in higher education. Their 
argument is based on the model that innovation requires highly educated labour 
while  imitation  can  be  performed  by  both  highly  educated  and  low  skilled 
workers. As per Global Competitiveness Report 2004-05, Pakistan ranks 94
th on 
the innovation index out of 102 countries. This reflects almost no innovation at 
all.  This  finding  puts  to  question  Pakistan’s  current  emphasis  on  higher 
education to the neglect of primary and secondary education. 
At school/college level Pakistan follows variety of systems that include: 
the O/A level system, the English-medium private and public schools that follow 
the syllabi prescribed by the government, the urdu-medium government schools 
and the madressah system. The ultimate result is that the elite few from the O/A 
level system and from English-medium schools perform better while the vast 
majority, in general, does not get the right kind of education and is therefore an 
underperformer. What is required is to have a single appropriate system that not 
only meets the need of the day but is dynamic enough as well to produce the 
professionals  and  skilled  workers  as  demanded  by  the  ever  changing 
environment. 
Another shortcoming of our education system is that it is merely focused 
on imparting knowledge with very little attention to imparting technical skills 
required  by  the  industry.  An  evidence  of  this  is  that  educational  institute 
awarding  degrees  in  Business  and  IT  are  mushrooming  but  very  few  poly- 
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technique institutes have come up while the industrial sector is starved of skilled 
labour. Thus the focus of the education system calls for a paradigm shift. 
From the above account it is apparent that the educational institutions 
have failed to provide good quality labour force in sufficient numbers to the 
labour market. Thus inappropriate functioning of the educational institutes is a 
serious impediment to growth.  
(e) Labour Market Institutions 
Pakistan ranks 78
th on the ‘Difficulty of hiring index’ that assigns value 
between 0-100 with the higher value being adverse. The ranking for OECD and 
region are 27 and 41.8 respectively. On the Job Training (OJT) is, considered an 
essential way of imparting skills to an industrial worker. Only 15 percent of the 
Pakistani  firms  covered  by  investment  climate  survey  reported  to  have 
sponsored OJT of their employees [World Bank (2006)]. 
Pakistan’s industrial labour market is over-regulated, especially in respect 
of hiring and firing, because of the strict provisions of the Industrial Relation 
Ordinance  (IRO)  like  minimum  wage  regulation  etc.  and  the  legal/defecto 
powers  enjoyed  by  trade  unions.  This  has  led  to  increase  in  trend  towards 
temporary  workers.  Though  this  development  has  provided  the  needed 
flexibility to the labour market, this has adversely affected the firms in respect of 
skill levels and the employees in terms of social security. It is apparent that the 
ease of hiring and firing and investment in imparting technical skills to workers 
will  foster  growth.  Thus  the  inappropriate  functioning  of  the  labour  market 
institutions is an impediment to growth.  
3.2.3. Market Failure  
(a) Asymmetric Information 
Akerlof  (1970)  was  the first  to  point  out that  asymmetric  information 
between buyers and sellers hinder trade and in the extreme case may even cause 
collapse of the market (Market for Lemons). To avoid the ‘Lemons problem’ a 
number of market structures have emerged that enable markets with asymmetric 
information to function. These include gaurantees/warranties and ‘sales returns’ 
etc. In Pakistan, sellers rarely accept ‘Returns’ thus any potential buyer who 
carries some apprehension about the product refuses to buy. The products for 
which Gaurantees/Warranties are available can perhaps be counted on finger 
tips.  Even for these products the enforcement of Gaurantees/Warranties runs 
into  problem  if  the  product  actually  turns  out  to  be  defective.  Thus  the 
institutions that are supposed to assure the buyer that he will get the value that 
he paid for are almost absent. The near absence of such institutions stifles trade 
and hence growth. However it is difficult to determine the exact volume of trade 
adversely affected on this count and therefore it is difficult to assess whether or 
not inadequacy of such institutions is a binding constraint.  
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(b) Innovation   
Schumpeter (1934) defines entrepreneurship as the process of carrying 
out new combination (innovation) through the process of ‘creative destruction’ 
thus he looks upon innovation as the critical link between entrepreneurship and 
economic  growth.  The  presence  of  competitive  environment  is  essential  to 
induce innovation. It is the free and flexible markets that will enable the closing 
down of business that have run their course and be replaced by more efficient 
firms [Haque (2007)]. What the lack of competition did to Pakistan’s industry is 
clear from  Hussain’s (1999) following statement.  
The external competition which would have beneficial effect on 
the  diffusion  of  technology  and  innovation,  efficient  use  of 
resources,  and  managerial  and  organisational  skills,  was 
conspicuously absent and left Pakistan’s industry lagging behind 
its competitors. 
A fairly competitive environment is a prerequisite for innovation while 
the business environment prevailing in Pakistan has been of rent seeking. For 
example, in the perspective of globalisation and WTO Din and Abbas (1999) 
argue that in the past textile industry despite receiving protection under high 
tariffs, subsidies, concessionary finance, subsidised cotton prices and numerous 
other incentives has not been able to achieve high efficiency. In 1959 Pakistan’s 
share of textile exports was 11 percent of world market share, today the share 
has declined to only slightly over 2 percent. The loss of world market share is 
due the failure to diversify into higher value added products. Neither the country 
diversified its textile exports into higher value-added product nor new products 
came up to make up for the export volume lost by textile sector.  
Overriding  features  of  the  policies  practiced  in  different  regimes  also 
shed light upon prevalence of rent seeking that served to constrain a competitive 
environment and hence innovation and growth. In ’50s the trade policy relying 
on high tariffs and quantitative restrictions conferred windfall gains on a small 
group of import licensees [Hussain (1999)], while in ’60s the import substituting 
industrialisation and the export bonus scheme allowed the exporters to amass 
wealth at the expense of other segments of the society. 1970 was the era of the 
public sector which by default is inimical to innovation because of the lack of 
incentives available to public officials for taking risk. However to explain the 
development of small scale sector during the Bhutto era John Adams and Sabiha 
Iqbal
8 argue that the development of small scale sector, during Bhutto era, is not 
owed to any incentives from the government rather it is the absence of favours 
extended to the large scale sector, that has been the norm in ’60s that gave a 
boost to the small scale sector. In ’80s and ’90s the banks, while in public sector 
                                             
 
8Cited in Zaidi (1999).  
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had  been  forced  to  lend  on  non  commercial  consideration  that  in  the  ’90s 
resulted in banks being burdened with huge non performing loans. The benefit 
of such loans went to a small elite class.   
The above account only seeks to illustrate that a rent seeking culture has 
characterised the economy through out its history.
9 This rent seeking culture has 
altogether eliminated the competitive environment that is so essential for the 
Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ to materialise. For an economy to prosper 
it must innovate new products as old products die off. Economies that fail to 
innovate are bound to exhibit slow growth. Thus it is the lack of innovation, 
which in turn stems from the rent seeking culture or the absence of competitive 
environment that forms one of the binding constraints to growth.   
(c ) Macro Risks / Macroeconomic Instability 
Hausmann, et al. argue that macroeconomic instability is determined by 
deficit  on  fiscal  account,  loss  of  international  reserves,  large  depreciation  of 
exchange rate and large external imbalances. Table 4 shows the data on these 
variables for several years.   
Table 4 
Indicators of Macroeconomic Stability  
Fiscal Deficit 




Deficit ($ bil.) 
1998-99  6.1  11.72  –1856 
1999-00  5.4  0.78  –217 
2000-01  4.3  23.79  –326 
2001-02  4.3  –6.32  2833 
2002-03  3.7  –3.75  4028 
2003-04  2.4  0.55  1812 
2004-05  3.3  2.72  –1,753 
 
Given  the  criteria  for  determining  macroeconomic  stability  referred 
above, Pakistan’s macroeconomic environment does not appear unstable since 
the last 5 years or so. The fiscal deficit, in recent past, has remained close to the 
level considered safe and the exchange rate during the past couple of years has 
remained more or less stable. However one should not loose sight of the fact that 
Pakistan’s growth episodes bears some correlation with the external shocks that 
the  economy  experienced  [Shaikh  (2006)].  Table  5  and  the  discussion  that 
follows highlight the point. 
                                             
 
9For an exhaustive account of rent-seeking, reading through the host of books written on 
Pakistan economy is essential. These include Zaidi (2005), Hussain (1999) etc.  
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                                                          Table 5  
GDP Growth Rates in Pakistan  
(Avg., Annual, %)  
1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s  2000-06 
GDP Growth  6.77  4.84  6.45  4.38  5.52* 
Source: Zaidi (2005). 
           *Average growth from 2003-04 to 2005-06 is 6.8 percent.  
Its apparent from Table 5 that Pakistan experienced three high growth 
episodes  during  its  60  years  history:  in  60s,  80s  and  00s.  Each  one  was 
accompanied by foreign aid in consequence of an external shock/war: cold war, 
Soviet-Afghan war and 9/11 respectively. None of the three lasted for more than 
4-5 years. In first two cases the growth episodes ended when foreign aid tapered 
off. [Shaikh (2006).] 
Given  the  above  account  the  risk  looms  large  that  if  geo-political 
environment does not remain as favourable to Pakistan as it is today, the current 
growth spell may meet the fate similar to the two earlier ones. However the geo-
political environment not being easily predictable, we assume that the politico-
economy  perspective would  not  change much  at  least in  the very  short run. 
Therefore we do not consider the macroeconomic environment to be a binding 
constraint to growth.  
3.4.  Social Returns  
(a)  Infrastructure  
The relationship between infrastructure and economic growth has been 
studied  extensively  for  United  States  and  other  developed  countries.
10 
Development economists have long recognised that social overhead capital is a 
necessary input in the structure of production [e.g., Hirschman (1958)]. Arrow 
and  Kurz  (1970)  and  Weitzman  (1970)  have  incorporated  infrastructure  into 
formal growth theory.   The impact of infrastructure on productivity of firms, 
welfare, and on overall growth is difficult to understand in developing countries 
because of lack of availability of data on social return to such investments. It is 
critical  not  to  combine  wasteful  infrastructure  with  productive  investments. 
Studies that rely on public spending patterns may not capture the true effect of 
infrastructure if there is widespread waste in spending [see Devarajan, et al. 
(1992)]. 
Pakistan has an area of 803,950 square kilometres and a population of 
around 157.9 millions. Pakistan, in 1947, inherited only 50,000 KMs of roads of 
                                             
 
10For instance, see Aschauer (1989a, 1989b), Munnell (1990), Eberts (1990), Holtz-Eakin 
(1994), Berndt and Hansson (1991).  
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various categories with a density of 0.06 KMs / Sq KMs areas and about 21,000 
registered vehicles only. The total length of paved roads in Pakistan is now in 
excess of 250,000 KMs and current national average road density stands at 0.32 
percent KMs /Sq KMs.
11  The transport sector account for about 8 percent of 
Pakistan’s GDP and is growing at 5 percent annually. Global Competitiveness 
Report  2006-07  ranks  Pakistan  at  101,  39th  and  87th  position  among  125 
countries for telephone lines, railroad infrastructure development and quality of 
electricity  supply  respectively.  Table  6  presents  the  comparison  of  overall 
quality of infrastructure amongst some selected Asian countries.  
Table 6 
Overall Infrastructure Quality  
Country  Score 
Indonesia  2.5 
India  3.3 
China  3.4 
Pakistan  3.4 
Thailand   5.0 
Korea  5.1 
Taiwan  5.4 
Malaysia  5.7 
Hong Kong  6.4 
Source: Global Competitiveness report 2006-07. 
Note:  (Score  of  1  reflects  highly  underdeveloped  infra-
structure  while  7  represents  as  extensive  and 
efficient as the world’s best).  
Given that quality of infrastructure in Pakistan is equivalent to that of 
China—a high growth performer and is better than that of Indonesia and India, 
we take the stand that quality of infrastructure is not a binding constraint to 
growth for Pakistan. However the gap between electricity demand and supply 
that has emerged very recently may seriously impede growth till the problem is 
resolved in the coming years.  
(b) Human Capital 
The literacy rate in Pakistan is 53 percent, enrolment rate is quite low and 
quality of education provided by public schools is poor. The issue is does low human 
of  human  capital  explains  unsatisfactory  growth  performance  of  a  country? 
Countries and regions that attained very high literacy rate, for example; Sri Lanka, 
Philippines  and  Costa  Rica  have  failed  to  show  decent  economic  growth.  The 
                                             
 
11Sources: Ministry of Industries and Production; Experts Advisory Cell, September 2003.  
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existence of good educational performers relative to income implies that investment 
in human capital does not invariably lead to high level of output.
12  
Following, Hausmann, et al. (2005) we take into account the return to 
investment  in  education  for  determining  whether  or  not  low  investment  in 
human capital is a binding constraint. The return to education for different levels 
of education are presented in Table 7. 
                              
Table 7 
Rate of Return for Primary, Secondary, and Higher Level of Education 
Year  RORp  RORs  RORh  Source 
1978-1979  4  5.6  6.3  Guisinger (1984)         
1985-1986  3.5  6.6  6.25  Ashraf (1993)            
1993-1994  0.97  4.9  6.95  Nasir (1998)             
2001-2002  1.52  3.94  9.02  Hyder (2005)             
Notes: (1) RORp, RORs and RORh shows rate of return to primary, secondary and higher level of 
education respectively.   
(2) The rate of return presented here should be used only as approximate figures because 
these have been calculated with different methodologies and different data sets.   
The rate of return to education in different time periods by and large show 
decreasing trends in primary and secondary schooling, however increasing trend 
is observed in case of higher education. When compared with other countries, 
these rates of return are not very high except for higher education. The relatively 
low rate of return implies that the country failed to produce high demand for 
primary and secondary level education. Given the rates of return for different 
levels of education, the scarcity of people educated up to the secondary level 
does not seem to be a constraint however shortage of highly educated people 
could be a constraint.  
We feel that the scarcity of highly educated people lies in the inadequacy 
of  educational  system  discussed  in  section  3.2.2(d).  First,  good  institutes  of 
higher learning are scarce and secondly the education system that prevails up to 
the higher secondary level does not allow a vast majority of poor and middle 
class  to  enter  good  schools  so  that  people  qualitatively  eligible  for  higher 
education are not available in sufficient numbers. Thus if at all the dearth of 
human capital is a constraint, it is the poorer educational system at the primary, 
secondary and higher secondary level that is at the heart of the matter.   
4. CONCLUSION 
Using the Hausmann, et al. (2005) decision tree methodology we have 
analysed as to what constitutes the binding constraint to growth in Pakistan. The 
                                             
 
12Pritchett (1996) “Where has all the education gone?”. Washington, DC: World Bank.  
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decision  tree  suggest  that  investment  and  hence  growth  may  be  constrained 
either due high cost of finance or due to low return to economic activity. We 
ruled  out  the  high  cost  of  finance  being  a  binding  constraint  to  growth  in 
Pakistan. As per the framework followed in this study, the primary reason for 
the cost of finance being high could be the low saving rate of the economy. 
Given  the  criteria,  we  do  not  consider  Pakistan  to  be  a  savings  constrained 
country because anything that is scarce carries a high price. Thus if the saving 
rate is low one should observe willingness to remunerate savings at higher rate. 
In this context we showed that the real interest rate in Pakistan is rather low and 
at times has even remained negative. Given the low interest rate on savings one 
cannot say that Pakistan is savings constrained. The fact that foreign debt is not 
too high also supports our contention that country is not savings constrained. 
Besides had the low savings rate been a constraint than the surge in remittances 
after 9/11 should have translated into higher investment. However dramatic rise 
in  real estate prices after  9/11  suggests that a sizable part of  the exogenous 
increase in foreign inflows has gone into real estate. Similarly, proceeding in 
this manner we also rule out infrastructure and human capital to be a binding 
constraint for Pakistan. 
We showed that the state of governance and the quality of institutions 
leaves much to be desired. We discussed at length that the functioning of legal 
institutions, educational institutions, Labour market institutions, SBP and SECP 
is not up to the mark. We argued that given the of failure of institutions that 
effect almost every aspect of life economic growth will remain constrained even 
if  factors  like  a  sound  saving  rate  are  in  place  because  the  institutional 
mechanism required for converting savings into investment leaves much to be 
desired. Thus we consider the failure of governance and that of institutions to be 
the binding constraint to growth.  
That innovation is an essential characteristic of a growing economy needs 
no  emphasis.  Given  that  the  level  of  innovation  has  remained  very  low  in 
Pakistan, we argued that rent seeking in the shape of licences, subsidies and 
tariff protection has not allowed the development of a competitive environment 
which is essential for the innovation to occur. Thus it is the prevalence of rent 
seeking environment that stifles innovation or viewing it the other way round, it 
is the lack of competitive environment which we consider to be yet another 





Year  GDP Growth  Year  GDP Growth 
90-91  5.6  98-99  4.2 
91-92  7.7  99-00  3.9 
92-93  2.3  00-01  2.5 
93-94  4.5  01-02  3.1 
94-95  5.2  02-03  4.8 
95-96  5.2  03-04  7.5 
96-97  1.7  04-05  8.6 
97-98  3.5  05-06  6.6 
Decade-Averages 
1960s  6.77  1990s  4.38 
1970s  4.84  2000s  5.52 
1980s  6.45   
Source: State Bank of Pakistan (Various Issues). Annual Reports.   
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Problem: Low Levels of Private Investment and Entrepreneurship          
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